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Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, the problem before us today, in the form of an amendment by my distinguished and beloved colleague from Texas (Mr. BENNSEN) is a tremendously serious one. We see how controversial it is, one not easy of solution. But, be that as it may, a decision must be made. Each of us must search his conscience and do what he feels is right for the security and survival of the Nation.

I want to say at this juncture—and I say it with deepest sincerity, the gentlemen who are opposed to Trident, are sincere, dedicated, and patriotic. They have firm convictions as to how we should proceed or delay—one way or the other.

For myself, I, too, have searched my conscience. This is an agonizing decision that we have to make because of its tremendous cost. Here we are indeed speaking about billions of dollars. But that is the price of peace. When we talk about national security, unfortunately, we always have to talk about it in terms of billions of dollars. I am more than a little staggered by it. As a matter of fact, before I came to the Senate 22 years ago I had hardly heard the word "billion." I never thought there was that kind of money around.

But, unfortunately, as I see it, we are living in the kind of world today where it is hard to say from day to day what the situation will be tomorrow. I mean, when we try to project ourselves into the future and try to determine what the situation in the world might be, let us say, a decade or a score of years from now, it is certainly difficult. Indeed it is quite impossible.

So many times in our Senate deliberations we have found ourselves wondering whether we have done too much or, regrettably on some occasions, whether we have done too little.

But I must say this, if ever we find we have done too much, but as a result, this world has been without conflict or that we have not involved the world in a nuclear or a thermonuclear holocaust, then about the only thing we can regret is that we spent some money.

On the other hand, if we do too little and a situation should arise analogous to the one in Cuba in October of 1962, suppose America had not have had the muscle to compel our adversary to turn back its ships and its warheads. That could have been disastrous for us. You will remember we were on the edge, we were on the brink, we were almost at the abyss of a nuclear war.

I know how John Kennedy agonized over those moments. Courageously, he took a very, very firm position. He said at that time, "You turn those warheads back from a Cuba that is only 90 miles from our own mainland or I will stop those ships and blow them up if necessary."

Because America had the power, Khrushchev turned his ships back.

I have said time and again that when history is recorded a 100 years from today it will show that for Khrushchev, at that moment, who was a man of understanding and great courage, it was the beginning of his political end.

Mr. President, I have been active on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy since 1953. We have sat in the classified sanctuary of that room that is guarded by a member of the police department 24 hours a day. No one can enter unless he signs his name and adequately identifies himself. No one can sit in the hearing unless he has been cleared or unless he is a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. It is a room that is constantly being debugged because of what transpires there.

We heard distinguished John McCondo when he was head of the CIA and, Allen Dulles, who came before him and now, of course, we have Mr. Helms who is the present Director of the CIA.

They come there and tell us about the nuclear progress and perils in the world. They tell us what progress our adversaries are making. Sometimes the evidence is so severe and so solemn and so serious that, frankly, it gives one goose bumps, to use the vernacular or it makes our hair stand up on our heads. That is the kind of world we are living in today.

Would it not be glorious for mankind, would it not be wonderful for the world, if we could take every bomb and defuse it, destroy it, dump it at the bottom of the ocean—if we could get all the nations of the world; the five members of the nuclear club, to do that. What a glorious day that would be for all mankind.

But all we can do is hope. All we can do is pray. Yet there is more that we can do: we can keep strong enough to make sure that no madman will have the audacity to take a chance and start such a war.

Now, as we have looked at this situation year in and year out, we have found that deterrence is the only guarantee we have against a nuclear holocaust. We have heard this time and again, "Who is going to win the next war?" My friends, no one is going to win the next war. If a global nuclear or thermonuclear war is touched off, it will mean the end of the world. It will mean the extinction of mankind. No one will win, I do not care how many Tridents we have, I do not care how many Polaris missiles we have, I do not care how many other kinds of missiles we have, I do not care how many bombers we have, I do not care how many aircraft carriers we have. No one will win that war once it starts. The only chance we will have is to do now what has to be done, to make sure that no one starts that holocaust. That is the name of the game: Deterrence.

Mr. President, how do we promote deterrence?

I realize that because I say a thing, that does not necessarily make it right. Other people have a perfect right to disagree with me. But I want the Senate to understand, I want the people of my State to understand, and I want the people of the country to understand that I do not want to spend 5 cents more than is absolutely necessary for our defense posture—not a nickel beyond our needs.

But, by the same token, I would not spare \$1—I would spare not \$1—to make sure that we guarantee security and freedom to posterity.

Mr. President, as we agonize over these problems, what do we do?

When a man is sick he goes to see his doctor. He does not try to cure himself because, after all, he has not had the training.

When we hold our hearings and want to get the best advice on subjects we ourselves have not been trained for, what do we do? We go to the experts.

When there is a case in court and we want to establish a medical point, what do we do? We call in the expert. If we have a situation in court that concerns the structure of a house, what do we do? We call in the architect and put him on the stand as an expert.

So, in this moment, what does JOHN PASTORE do?

He looks for the expert. To whom does he turn? He turns to the father of the nuclear Navy, Admiral Rickover. I am telling the people in the Senate at this moment and the people of the country, whether they agree with him or not, his name will be immortal when American history is written. I am talking about Hyman Rickover, the father of our nuclear Navy. It was he who gave us the *Nautilus*. It was he who, against the resistance of the Navy Department, said, "I can make a submarine that can be propelled and stay under water for 30 days if necessary." And he did it.

So, this morning, realizing that this debate would come and realizing that there would be a serious and sincere difference of opinion, I telephoned "Rick" as I call him, and I said, "Admiral, on Trident give it to me, and give it to me straight. I want a Dear John letter from you." Here is my "Dear John" letter. I want to read my "Dear John" letter to the Members of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, what time remains?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BEALL). The Senator from Mississippi has 86 minutes remaining. The Senator from Texas has 129 minutes remaining.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield the Senator an additional 15 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized for another 15 minutes.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, the letter reads:

JULY 27, 1972.

DEAR JOHN: In our telephone conversation this morning you requested that I furnish you my views on the following: (1) the need for the Trident submarines, (2) what research has already been done on the Trident submarine and missile, (3) my personal opinion on the feasibility and practicality of the Trident design.

Those are the questions I put to him, and these are the answers he gave in the "Dear John" letter:

The Trident submarines and missiles are needed to increase the survivability of our seaborne deterrent in the 1980's and beyond, and to provide for replacement of our aging Polaris submarines, the oldest of which will be nearly 20 years old before the first Trident submarine becomes operational in the late 1970's.

Our Polaris submarines are limited in their patrol area by the range of their missiles.